Greek / American Operational Group Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
Memoirs of World War 2

Authorization and Establishment of the Operational Groups

Quotation from the U.S. National Archives document.

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Office of Strategic Services Report

Operational Groups were authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 23 December 1942, which provided that the OSS should organize operational nuclei to be used in enemy and enemy-occupied territories. The OGs were highly trained foreign-language speaking soldiers skilled in methods of sabotage and small arms, and trained parachutists, designed to be used in small groups behind enemy lines to harass the enemy.

The first definite request for OGs developed out of the approval by AFGH of JCS 170, which set forth the objectives of the OSS in the Western Mediterranean. The request, as it applied to OGs, involved four to eight operational groups to be used as organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei in areas adjacent to North Africa. When the War Department was requested to assign officers and men for OG operations in NATO, G-1 inquired whether tables of organization would also be submitted for other theaters. OSS replied in the affirmative, and the War Department granted the OGs approximately 540 slots.

The OG branch was established 13 May 1943. Following the initial allotment to OG, a recruiting program was immediately undertaken. It was thought that the best qualified men would be found in line outfits, and for this reason the first OGs were secured from infantry and engineer units. Radio operators were secured from the Signal Corps and trained medical technicians from the Medical Corps. Knowledge of foreign language was essential.

Prospective recruits were usually interviewed in groups made up of individuals who met the two basic requirements of physical qualifications and linguistic ability in order to judge whether they were otherwise suitable. They were given the opportunity to volunteer for hazardous duty behind enemy lines. Such groups were then advised that interested individuals would be granted personal interviews. In the interests of security, operational plans were not divulged, yet enough was said that each recruit understood what he might expect. Only men giving evidence of real desire for such duty were chosen. It was found that approximately 10 percent of those initially interviewed subsequently volunteered.

On 27 November 1944, the Operational Group Command was activated as a separate military unit within the OSS. This was the result of several factors which indicated the wisdom of separating the OGs as far as possible from the OSS administratively. One such consideration was experience in the field indicating that OGs were likely, despite the fact they operated exclusively in uniform, to be treated without regard to the Geneva Convention when captured. It was felt for their own protection, in the event of capture, every effort should be made to eliminate the possibility of connection with the OSS. Another consideration was the fact the OGs were exclusively military, and the quasi-military administration of OSS caused some confusion. OSS continued throughout, however, to maintain coordinated operational control.

The OGs recruited for Italian Operations were designated Company A, those for the France Operations were designated Company B, and those for the Balkans (Yugoslavian and Greek), were designated Company C. An additional unit, not designated by a company symbol, consisted of OGs to be used in Norway.

In August, 1944, the OGs became known as the 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, (Separate) (Provincial). At that time the OGs numbered 1,100.

The OGs were not Rangers, an idea which General Donovan had sponsored in early 1942. However, they did participate as commandos and Rangers in some aspects of their operations. The distinction was simply that, while Donovan saw Rangers as operating in front of the enemy, the OGs fitted into the pattern of OSS activities behind enemy lines.

All of the Operational Groups saw action.

Operational Group Command: The communication system used was the British net-work. This was agreed by the OSS in Cairo, due to the fact that the British wished to keep a single focal point for information and control and did not wish to risk confusion that might result from having the Operations Groups reporting by radio to other headquarters than their own. Thus, in order to centralize tactical command, the Operational Groups entered Greece without their own radios.

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Publisher's Comment

• [Readers with scholarly pursuit should be able to locate the document in the National Archives through the data within the quotation, here above. This instance aside, the fuller references are given for the (other) quotations from the National Archives documents in these memoirs.]